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This article focuses on the dialogue diplomacy that Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny initiated in the
late 1960s to engage apartheid South Africa. Although contemporary observers and subsequent scholars
(have) derided the scheme as an act of acquiescence and even betrayal, I argue that Ivory Coast's dialogue
diplomacy was neither accommodationist nor dependent on the prodding of neocolonial powers such as
France. A Pan-Africanist extension of the home-grown neotraditional practice of Dialogue ivoirienne, the
diplomatic initiative never got the backing of other African states. A close analysis of the Ivory Coast's
maneuvers in the context of an increasing radicalization of the anti-apartheid movement sheds a new light on
the complexity of the transnational politics to defeat apartheid.
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An Unconventional Challenge to Apartheid: The Ivorian Dialogue
Diplomacy with South Africa, 1960–1978
By Abou B. Bamba
Gettysburg College (abamba@gettysburg.edu)

In early September 1975, a Johannesburg newspaper broke the news that an Ivorian
delegation led by Laurent Dona Fologo (Minister of Information) was about to start a
twelve-day visit to South Africa. The planned trip was the culmination of a dialogue
diplomacy that Ivory Coast initiated in the late 1960s and was a clear departure from the
isolation policy that African states were trying to implement so as to pressure the apartheid
regime in Pretoria. Even though the visit had been arranged by a black South African, the
Ivorian scheme was bound to stir controversy. Indeed, the very news of sending a
“Dialogue mission” to South Africa led President Marien Ngouabi of the Congo to dismiss
the initiative as a “grotesque masquerade.” Other African opinion-makers echoed
Ngouabi’s rejection, including Paul Bernetel—an influential columnist at the Paris-based
weekly Jeune Afrique—who found the trip ill timed.1
African public opinion in reaction to the Ivorian mission was largely hostile and
dismissive, deriding the visit as an act of acquiescence and even betrayal. I argue in this
article that a critical look at the Fologo mission and the larger Ivorian stance can shed new
light on the complex transnational politics used to fight apartheid. First, unlike the claim
that the Ivorian policy-makers acted on the prodding of the French, I suggest that Ivory
Coast’s dialogue initiative was primarily a Pan-Africanist extension of the home-grown
practice of “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne.”2 Moreover, by sending a multiracial delegation to
South Africa, the Ivorian authorities genuinely attempted to undermine apartheid, in that
1 Patrick Laurence, “Fologo Arrives on a ‘Mission of Peace,’” Rand Daily Mail [Johannesburg], 11

September 1975; “Dialogue: ‘Ivorian Weapon,’” West Africa [London], 29 September 1975; Paul Bernetel,
“Un voyage inopportun,” Jeune Afrique [Paris], 19 September 1975. Reportedly it was Professor Winifred
M. Kgware who arranged for the visit. For details, see Patrick Laurence, “‘I Talked Fologo into It,’ Says
Prof,” Rand Daily Mail, 9 September 1975. It is equally plausible that the Ivorian president and Johannes B.
Vorster had discussed that trip during their secret meeting of Yamoussoukro in September 1974. For details,
see Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, 3rd ed. (Pretoria: Department of Information, 1976),
871–72.
2 On the history and workings of “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne,” see W. Joseph Campbell, The Emergent

Independent Press in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire: From Voice of the State to Advocate of Democracy (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1998), 78–81; Lanciné Sylla, “La dynamique de la reconciliation et de la prevention des conflits
en Côte d’Ivoire,” Africa [São Paulo] 20–21 (1997–1998), 9–26; Michael Cohen, Urban Policy and Political
Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 115–44;
Jeanne M. Toungara, “The Apotheosis of Côte d’Ivoire’s Nana Houphouët-Boigny,” Journal of Modern
African Studies 28, 1 (1990), 34–35.
Copyright © 2014 by the Board of Trustees of Boston University.
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they took inspiration from the transnational politics that led to desegregation in the United
States. Thus, focusing on the period between 1960 when a distinctive African voice in the
anti-apartheid movement emerged and 1978 when the Ivorian authorities backed down
from their public call for dialogue with South Africa, the article recounts the vicissitudes of
an activist, if misunderstood, diplomacy.
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the man who sent Fologo and his delegation to Pretoria,
was not a newcomer to Pan-African diplomacy.3 In fact, his political career had long been
marked by the desire to secure a place of leadership for himself and for his country in
Francophone West Africa’s regional politics. During the heyday of decolonization he
spearheaded the creation of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a
particularly vocal trans-territorial nationalist political organization in French West Africa.4
Although he was eclipsed somewhat later on by younger and more militant West African
politicians, the statesman (whom many referred to as Le Vieux or Wise Old Man) had, by
the 1970s, succeeded in establishing a regional hegemony in the framework of relatively
loose inter-state organizations within Francophone West Africa. 5 Houphouët-Boigny’s
diplomatic initiatives toward the rest of Africa, including South Africa, were meant to
further this leadership role steeped in an inflated deployment of dialogue. To achieve his
rather narrowly defined goal, the Ivorian president adopted flexible strategies that shifted
according to the particular junctures of African politics. Although the old statesman had
backed the militant Pan-African coalition against apartheid in the early 1960s, he had by
the 1970s come to favor a policy of negotiation and dialogue, which he claimed did “not
necessarily lead to political recognition of the South African regime.”6 What prompted
such a volte-face in Houphouët-Boigny? What was the nature of the proposed dialogue
diplomacy? How did Le Vieux’s peers and the larger African public opinion receive the
plan? Within the dual context of a radicalization of the worldwide anti-apartheid
movement and the increasing paranoia of the Afrikaner ruling elite in South Africa, was
the plan viable at all?
In examining these questions I have come to see the Houphouëtian diplomacy of
dialogue as a failure. I do so not only on the evidence that the Ivorian leader was unable to
3 For an insightful biography of Houphouët-Boigny’s life, see Fréderic Grah Mel, Félix Houphouët-

Boigny, 3 vols. (Abidjan/Paris: Editions du CERAP/Maisonneuve & Larose/Karthala, 2003–2010). See also
Paul-Henri Siriex, Houphouët-Boigny: An African Statesman (Paris: NEA and Nathan, 1987).
4 Elizabeth Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement

in Guinea 1939–1958 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005); Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West
Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2002); Ruth Schachter Morgenthau,
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
5 Virginia Thompson, West Africa’s Council of the Entente (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1972); Jacques Baulin, La politique africaine d’Houphouët-Boigny (Paris: Eurafor-Press, 1980). For an
overview of Ivorian diplomacy under Houphouët-Boigny, see Marc A. Ziké, La politique étrangère de la
Côte d’Ivoire (1959–1993): Une diplomatie au service de la paix et du développement (Abidjan: COPRECA
Edition, 1994).
6 “Vorster Hints He Will Establish Ties with Black African States,” New York Times, 6 November

1970.
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convince the South African government to trust black South Africans, but also on the
observation that Ivorian diplomacy could not bring on board the influential members of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Pan-African intellectuals, the African press, and
to a lesser degree, the transnational anti-apartheid movement. Given the timing of Le
Vieux’s dialogue scheme and despite his much acclaimed “skills at persuasion and
negotiation,” the Ivorian president could not persuade the OAU and the African antiapartheid coalition to espouse his ideas.7 This does not necessarily imply that HouphouëtBoigny’s stance vis-à-vis apartheid was accommodationist; very much the opposite. As the
examination of his September 1975 diplomatic maneuvers demonstrates, by sending a
multiracial delegation led by Minister Laurent Dona Fologo (and his white wife—Danièle
Fologo) to South Africa, the Ivorian leader did attempt to subvert the South African racist
ideology even as he seemed to save Pretoria from the diplomatic isolation that both grassroots organizations and the international community deemed critical to the overthrow of
apartheid.
By focusing renewed attention to the modality of President Houphouët-Boigny’s
engagement, I wish not to rehabilitate a man whose Machiavellian paternalism needs no
further demonstration. However, I deem it necessary to complicate the assessment of his
diplomatic ploys vis-à-vis apartheid. 8 While a number of studies have explored the
dialogue diplomacy, very few have seriously analyzed the tactics and arguments of the
official Ivorian side in this episode of the anti-apartheid movement.9 In a certain sense,
revisiting this chapter in the diplomacy against apartheid will challenge the basic
conclusion of an Ivorianist (and by extension, Africanist) historiography that still views
anyone who ventured to propose a different philosophy of action regarding the South
African question as a “sellout” or “lackey” of Western imperialism and neocolonialism.10
7 For Le Vieux’s skills as a negotiator, see Toungara, “Apotheosis,” 51; Siriex, Houphouët-Boigny, 309.
8 The literature on Houphouët-Boigny’s Machiavellian ploys is extensive. For a short list, see Samba

Diarra, Les faux complots d’Houphouët-Boigny: Fracture dans le destin d’une nation (Paris: Karthala, 1997);
Laurent Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire: Pour une alternative démocratique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1983); Marcel
Amondji, Félix Houphouët et la Côte d’Ivoire: L’envers d’une légende (Paris: Karthala, 1984).
9 Roger Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961–1994

(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005), 48–76; Sifiso M. Ndlovu, “The ANC’s Diplomacy and
International Relations,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 2, 1970–1980, ed. SADET Trust
(Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2004), 615–67. There are some exceptions to this trend, but the couple
of studies that have looked at the dialogue diplomacy from the Ivorian side usually fall short of analyzing Le
Vieux’s actions as serious and potentially consequential diplomatic moves. For details, see Baulin, La
politique africaine, 199–208; Daniel Bach, “L’insertion ivoirienne dans les rapports internationaux,” in Y.-A.
Fauré and J.-P. Médard, eds., Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d’Ivoire (Paris: Karthala, 1982), 110–12. Grah
Mel’s latest installment on the life of the Ivorian statesman provides a more nuanced, if largely popular,
account. For details, see Félix Houphouët-Boigny, vol. 3: La fin et la suite (Abidjan/Paris: Editions du
CERAP/Karthala, 2010), 101–31. Finally, there is one first-hand account of this episode of the dialogue
diplomacy from an Ivorian perspective. For details, see Gaoussou Kamissoko, De Yamoussoukro à Pretoria:
Le chemin du dialogue (Abidjan: NEA, 1985).
10 A prime example of this historiographical school is Pierre Nandjui, Houphouët-Boigny: L’homme de

la France en Afrique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995). See also Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire, 168–70. Revealingly, the
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To portray the likes of Houphouët-Boigny as puppets of Western interests is to subscribe
to a historiographical tradition that sees Africans only as powerless, with little agency. I
argue that it might serve Ivorianist scholars well to rethink such views, especially when
some of the supposedly all powerful Western actors have suggested that in many instances
it was the Ivorian leader who manipulated his European peers.11
Tracking the Routes of a Dialogue Diplomacy
The story of the Ivorian call for dialogue with Pretoria confirms Pierre Kipré’s laconic
observation that Houphouët-Boigny’s engagement with apartheid South Africa can be best
described as “ambiguous.” 12 Before independence, Ivorian authorities had been quite
critical of the apartheid regime. In July 1959, Fraternité (mouthpiece of Le Vieux’s party)
had labeled the South African regime a “short-sighted government” which used an
“indefensible racial principle” that has “worn out the patience of the Africans.”13 In the
years following Ivory Coast’s independence, Le Vieux and his lieutenants joined the PanAfrican chorus in denouncing apartheid, which they described as an “anachronistic”
system. 14 In this vein, Arsène Usher Assouan, the Ivorian ambassador to the United
Nations in the 1960s, violently criticized both Portuguese and South African leaders who
had come to “lock themselves” in a historical time that most people had left behind. As a
consequence, Assouan continued, the victims of Portuguese and South African rule were
forced to envision “war or subversion” as the only possibility for emancipation. However,
in a move that prefigured things to come, the Ivorian diplomat concluded that Africa
needed peace—a concept that neither the Portuguese nor the white South Africans seemed
to understand.15 In subsequent years, a web of domestic events and regional geopolitical
entanglements would force Houphouët-Boigny to focus on the consolidation of the Council
of the Entente and to tighten his grip on power within Ivory Coast.
It was in this crucible that dialogue emerged as a privileged, if self-serving, means
of political communication. This context is important because it allows us to see that the
origins of Le Vieux’s dialogue diplomacy were beyond the seeming dependency of Ivory
Coast on France. In fact, if there is any single root of the diplomatic posture, it is to be
found in Houphouët-Boigny’s “style of rule” which, in the words of Jeanne Toungara, was
members of the scholarly school seem to reiterate the ideas of some of the historical actors without much
critical distance. For details, see Ansoumane Bangoura, “L’imperialisme et ses agents,” Horoya (Conakry),
11–17 July 1976; “Beware of the Tempter,” Sechaba (Dar es Salaam/London), January 1971.
11 Jacques Foccart and Philippe Gaillard, Foccart parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, 2 vols.

(Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995–1996). See also, Baulin, La politique africaine, 50–58; Felix O. Alalade,
“President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the Ivory Coast, and France,” Journal of African Studies 6, 3 (Autumn
1979), 122–31.
12 Pierre Kipré, Côte d’Ivoire: La formation d’un peuple (Paris: Sides-Ima, 2005), 218.
13 “Troubles raciaux,” Fraternité (Abidjan), 3 July 1959.
14 K.A.J., “Intolérable ségrégation,” Fraternité, 1 April 1960.
15 “M. Usher stigmatise l’attitude du Portugal et de l’Afrique du Sud,” Abidjan Matin, 22 November

1962. On the significance of the rhetoric of peace and dialogue in Ivorian diplomatic action, see Ziké,
Politique étrangère, 99–102.
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“greatly influenced by the application of traditional concepts in a modern context.”16 As
we shall see, no other practice better typified this astute combination of the old and the
new than the mobilization of the so-called “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne” as a political weapon.
Dialogue—a neotraditional reactualization of the institution of the palaver tree—
had been used repeatedly in Ivory Coast since the late 1950s to diffuse and even settle
social unrest and other political conflicts.17 In the aftermath of decolonization, it became
the favorite tool of political communication of the Ivorian leadership. In times of crises
such as those involving the alleged plots of 1963–1964 or the student unrest of 1967–1968,
Houphouët-Boigny used dialogue in the form of mass meetings and face-to-face
discussions to “legitimize his action while permitting some symbolic participation in the
decision-making process.” 18 The legacy of these political moves may have proved
problematic since dialogue only “strengthen[ed] the single-party state and expand[ed] its
reach in society.”19 Yet in the context of the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, it allowed
Houphouët-Boigny to retain the reins of power. Given the relative success in mobilizing
dialogue to manage politics within the Ivory Coast, it might have been tempting to
implement the same technique to address Africa-wide problems, including the crisis that
resulted from South Africa’s policy of racial segregation.20
Since the first wave of decolonization on the continent, much of the African
diplomacy against apartheid South Africa had been left in the hands of regional actors in
Southern Africa and Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah. 21 By the late 1960s,
however, Houphouët-Boigny was becoming less impressed by the policies carried out by
his peers vis-à-vis Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies. In May 1967, he
reportedly told the U.S. ambassador to Ivory Coast that all the African leaders could
accomplish was to merely take “some platitudinous resolutions about Angola and Southern
Africa, with no attention to realistic means of implementation.”22 Some months later
Houphouët-Boigny reiterated his point claiming that, “African policies toward South
Africa, Rhodesia, [and] Portuguese Africa are getting nowhere.” Then he concluded: the
“only hope of progress lies in resuming dialogue” with the authorities of those
countries/territories.23 Although it fed on the omnipotent “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne,” the
Ivorian leader’s move was clearly a nod to the “Outward policy,” which South African
16 Toungara, “Apotheosis,” 25. See Sylla, “Dynamique de la reconciliation,” 15.
17 For this interpretation of dialogue as a form of neotraditionalism, see Sylla, “Dynamique de la

reconciliation,” 13, and Campbell, Emergent Independent Press, 77.
18 Cohen, Urban Policy and Political Conflict, 117.
19 Campbell, Emergent Independent Press, 78.
20 Grah Mel, Houphouët-Boigny, vol. 3, Fin et suite, 34, 106–107.
21 Jeffrey S. Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing

Africa,” Kronos 37, 1 (2011), 23–40.
22 Abidjan to Department of State, 24 May 1967, Papers of George A. Morgan, Box 1, Lyndon B.

Johnson Library (hereafter, LBJ Library), Austin, Texas.
23 Abidjan to Department of State, 7 November 1967, Papers of George A. Morgan, Box 1, LBJ

Library.
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authorities embraced when Johannes B. Vorster assumed the Premiership in 1966.24 But
domestic events compelled Houphouët-Boigny to focus again on Ivory Coast, even as he
remained “determine[ed] to recognize and establish closer relations with South Africa.”25
At the Fifth Congress of Ivory Coast’s ruling party (the Parti Démocratique de Côte
d’Ivoire [PDCI]) in October 1970, Houphouët-Boigny turned this theoretical determination
into practice when he publicly declared himself in favor of dialogue with the white
minority government in Pretoria.26 Domestically, the Ivorian president had just survived
yet another challenge to his authority by young technocrats who were demanding the
expansion of the gerontocratic boundaries of the patrimonial state. Through cunning and
the use of dialogue, the Ivorian statesman once again had overcome opposition to his
mercurial rule. Past the storms of unrest, he could now devote his time to foreign policy,
including the South African puzzle.27 Houphouët-Boigny’s resurgent activism found its
first public manifestation in January 1971 at a gathering of Francophone African countries
in Chad. Although the efforts at rallying his Francophone peers were not successful, the
Ivorian leader did not concede defeat. Rather, he opted to shape international public
opinion by organizing a press conference to which some 126 international journalists were
invited.28 At that media event held on 28 April 1971, the man whom many observers
considered a moderate affirmed: “I believe that dialogue with the Whites of South Africa is
possible, especially if we locate it within the neutral framework of a peace through
neutrality.” Such peace, Houphouët-Boigny argued, would be a “peace that involves all the
Africans, both the Whites of South Africa as well as ourselves. White South Africans must
overcome apartheid which is the sole cause of disunion between them and their black
brothers of Africa.”29
24 Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States, 39–104; Ndlovu, “ANC’s Diplomacy,” 616;

Robert S. Jaster, The Defence of White Power (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), 11.
25 David Rockefeller to Henry Kissinger, 4 April 1969, White House Central Files, GEN CO 73,

Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter, RMN Library), Yorba Linda, California. For a quick
overview of Le Vieux’s domestic difficulties, see Diarra, Faux complots, 65–97; Grah Mel, HouphouëtBoigny, vol. 2, Epreuve du pouvoir, 277–304.
26 Theodore Eliot to Henry Kissinger, 25 November 1970, National Security Files, Box 737: Ivory

Coast, RMN Library; Kamissoko, De Yamoussoukro à Pretoria, 12; Nandjui, L’homme de la France, 204.
See also, Grah Mel, Houphouët-Boigny, vol. 3, La fin et la suite, 106–107.
27 Theodore Eliot to Henry Kissinger, 25 November 1970, National Security Files, Box 737: Ivory

Coast, RMN Library.
28 William Borders, “Vorster Bid Gets Support in Africa: Ivory Coast’s Leader Urges Black Nations to

Join in Efforts for Closer Ties,” New York Times, 29 April 1971; Claude Lemelin, “Africa’s Chief
Emphasizes ‘Dialogue,’” Washington Post, 29 April 1971; Daniel Bach, “Les initiatives franco-sudafricaines de ‘dialogue’ avec l’Afrique francophone,” in Daniel Bach, ed., La France et l’Afrique du Sud:
Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains (Paris and Nairobi: Editions Karthala and CREDU, 1990), 211;
Baulin, La politique africaine, 206.
29 Kamissoko, De Yamoussoukro à Pretoria, 13. See also Nandjui, L’homme de la France, 204; Sam

Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1975), 274.
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Arsène Usher Assouan, as Ivorian delegate to the OAU Ministerial Council,
heartily defended this stance at the June 1971 meeting of the Pan-African organization.
When the matter came to a vote, however, a too strong majority of the member-states of
the union rejected his proposal.30 Nonetheless, the Ivorian president remained confident.
He quietly sent Laurent Dona Fologo to sound out the American authorities on the issue of
dialogue.31 More tellingly, an interview in Fraternité Matin showed that HouphouëtBoigny had stubbornly decided to move ahead, for he vowed to intensify efforts to rally
other like-minded African leaders and possibly to send a delegation to South Africa.32
An Ivorian mission on a “private visit” did arrive in Pretoria in early October 1971.
Reportedly, the head of the Ivorian delegation was even received by Premier Vorster.33
The Pan-African outcry that ensued must have deterred other countries from associating
themselves with Houphouët-Boigny’s diplomatic move. 34 By mid-1972 the Ivorian
president had come to doubt any prospect of success for his attempt at a Pan-African
mobilization for his dialogue diplomacy. The effects of this conjuncture are revealed
obliquely in a letter of the French Chargé d’Affaires in Pretoria to the Quai d’Orsay.
Reporting on an interview that Arsène Usher Assouan gave to Raymond Louw (editor of
the Rand Daily Mail), the French diplomat noted:
Mr. Assouan Usher seemingly told Mr. Louw that Ivory Coast still believes in the
politics of dialogue, but that it must convince other African countries of its
usefulness. The Ivory Coast will not act without the consent of these [African]
countries. Thus any direct conversation between Ivory Coast and South Africa was
premature.35
But the Ivorian authorities were not conceding defeat on the issue of dialogue. In fact, they
were ready to re-establish direct exchange with the South African government on the
condition that South Africa officially declared that all men are created equal and publicly

30 Gilbert Comte, “Remous autour du projet de dialogue avec Pretoria: Le Président Houphouët-Boigny

aura du mal à rallier les Etats francophones à ses thèses,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), June 1971; “OAU
Dissension as Emperor Pleads for Unity,” Guardian (Manchester), 16 June 1971; Colin Legum, “Ivory Coast
Walks Out over Agenda: Objects to ‘Dialogue,’” Washington Post, 19 June 1971; “Black Africa Rejects
‘Dialogue’ with S. Africa,” Washington Post, 24 June 1971; Bach, “Initiatives franco-sud-africaines,” 212.
31 Jerry Warren to Ronald Ziegler, 8 October 1971, White House Central Files, (EX) CO 73, RMN

Library.
32 Félix Houphouët-Boigny (interview with Laurent D. Fologo), “Houphouët rompt le silence: ‘Nous

enverrons une mission à Prétoria pour le dialogue,’” Fraternité Matin (Abidjan), 4 October 1971. Fraternité
Matin replaced Fraternité in 1963 when the latter merged with Abidjan-Matin.
33 Paul Hofmann, “Border Incidents Stall Vorster’s Bid for Talks,” New York Times, 8 October 1971;

“Black Envoys Visit Pretoria,” New York Times, 7 October 1971; Ndlovu, “ANC’s Diplomacy,” 623–24;
Bach, “L’insertion ivoirienne,” 111; Baulin, La politique africaine, 207; Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa,
278.
34 Ndlovu, “ANC’s Diplomacy,” 624.
35 Chargé d’Affaires [Pretoria] to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 31 August 1972, Archives des

postes/Abidjan, Carton 43, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques (hereafter, CAD), Nantes, France.
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committed itself to the abolition of racial discrimination. Only then would a world
conference be organized to promote reconciliation among South Africans.36
Although the South African officials never complied with these demands, the
Ivorian leader staged in 1973 a “world peace conference” in Abidjan where, according to
one zealot of Houphouëtism, “more than 3,000 delegates gathered to listen to the apostle
and militant of world peace.”37 Reportedly, the old statesman cautioned his disciples
against using armed struggle to solve the South African question for “it is usually better to
engage in dialogue than to dramatize.”38 If the aim of that media event was to sway the
African opinion to the politics of dialogue, it seems to have had little impact. Thus
Houphouët-Boigny had to wait until the mid-1970s to see the emergence of a new
opportunity for his dialogue agenda.
This prospect came in the form of the Carnation Revolution when, on 25 April
1974, a group of army officers mounted a mutiny that led to the overthrow of the Caetano
government in Portugal.39 The new political situation in Lisbon led to an alteration of the
geopolitical balance of forces in Southern Africa. Portugal’s withdrawal from the region
spelled the collapse of the South African “cordon sanitaire.” Aware of this disturbing
prospect, the realist Vorster indulged in a series of meetings meant to resuscitate the
détente plans that had been laid in 1967.40 Thus, in late 1974, the South African Premier
became personally involved in the negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia,
whose white settlers had declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 in an
attempt to shortcut black-led decolonization. In a similar move, he made surreptitious
overtures to both the Frente de Liberacão de Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Zambian
president, Kenneth Kaunda. 41 What a contemporary observer dubbed the “secret
diplomacy of détente” was extended beyond southern Africa, since in September 1974 the
Afrikaner Premier met with Houphouët-Boigny in his hometown of Yamoussoukro.42
Though the military invasion of Angola by the apartheid forces would bring a halt to

36 Ibid.
37 Harold B. Martinson, Felix Houphouët-Boigny at the Service of World Peace, abrig ed. (Abidjan:

Editions du Souvenir, 1992), 53–54.
38 Ibid., 54.
39 Paul Bernetel, “Où en est l’OUA?” Jeune Afrique, 7 March 1975. See also Avelino Rodríguez,

Cesário Borga, and Mário Cardoso, Portugal en Revolución (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1977), 7.
40 “Kenneth Kaunda: ‘M. Vorster est un réaliste,’” Jeune Afrique, 21 March 1975; “For the Liberation

of South Africa and All Her People: No Dialogue with Apartheid!” Vukani/Awake (underground/South
Africa), March 1975.
41 Graham Hovey, “Vorster’s Détente II,” New York Times, 1 April 1975; Colin Legum, Southern
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Vorster’s diplomatic offensive, the seeds of discord within the African coalition against
apartheid South Africa had been sown anew.
Nothing testified more clearly to the re-emergence of jarring dissonances than the
heated debate driving the February 1975 budgetary session of the OAU in Addis Ababa.
The mood at that session was so electric that, in an effort to prevent the OAU from losing
face, the Algerian Foreign Minister had to propose that a special session be called to deal
with the question of détente with Vorster.43 When the date of the eagerly awaited meeting
came, Houphouët-Boigny, through his envoy Assouan, quickly pressed for the adoption of
a policy of dialogue with apartheid South Africa. With the signatories of the Lusaka
Accords backing off, however, the future of dialogue was once again doomed. As Vorster
recognized a week later, the member-states of the OAU “decided to close the door to
détente and dialogue.”44 But the Ivory Coast authorities gave a radically different reading
of the policy document that resulted from the meeting—the Dar es Salaam Declaration on
Southern Africa. Indeed, in an article entitled “L’unique voie” (The Only Solution), the
editor-in-chief of Fraternité Matin claimed that the OAU special session confirmed the
legitimacy of dialogue. Then the editorialist concluded:
They certainly are disappointed, those duplicitous champions of violence who sit in
the comfort of their palaces and remain far removed from the war zones. They must
be disheartened at reading the “Dar-es-Salaam Declaration” which recommends,
just like the Lusaka Manifesto, to explore all the promise of dialogue with Vorster
and Ian Smith rather than to use force.45
Even if language is polysemic, nothing was so removed from the spirit of the Dar es
Salaam resolution. In fact, not only did the text reject the kind of détente that Vorster was
advocating, but it also reiterated Africa’s “support to the national liberation movements of
South Africa in their struggle in all its forms.”46 In hindsight, however, it appears that the
Ivorian newsman was paving the way for the boldest act of his president’s politics of
dialogue: the sending of an official delegation to South Africa in September 1975; a
delegation led by none other than Fologo who was accompanied by his French wife.
It is revealing, if ironic, that upon arrival at Jan Smuts Airport, HouphouëtBoigny’s envoy told reporters that in the quest of peace through dialogue, “no sacrifice
will be spared, not even sacrifice of self-respect.”47 While he never refused to socialize and
43 Paul Bernetel, “Où en est l’OUA?” Jeune Afrique, 7 March 1975.
44 Paul Bernetel, “L’Afrique contre le dialogue,” Jeune Afrique, 2 May 1975.
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drink toasts with the Afrikaner ruling elite, Fologo made no bones about voicing his
repulsion for apartheid South Africa, which he even called a “sick” society. He also lashed
out at apartheid, calling it a “poison.”48 Given such a seemingly contradictory stance,
many contemporaries wondered about the motivations prompting Houphouët-Boigny to
send a delegation to apartheid South Africa. All the more so since rumors in certain liberal
circles in South Africa suspected material benefits for the West African country. In fact, as
early as 1973 they argued that Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue diplomacy was aimed at
helping Ivory Coast fill out its “empty” hotel rooms with South African tourists. In other
words, Ivorian calls for dialogue was informed by a desperate search for South African
partners to salvage the economy of West African country.49
In response to these rumors and other accusations, Fologo made the following
statement as soon as he reached Johannesburg: “Our country is not even looking for
investment. We already have investors.”50 Although South Africa was Ivory Coast’s fifth
largest trading partner—a fact that Ivorian officials strove to hide from the international
community—Fologo’s claim must not be dismissed altogether. 51 For, at the time
Houphouët-Boigny was promoting a dialogue diplomacy with South Africa, the economy
of Ivory Coast was on the road of success—prompting some analysts to dub the Ivorian
experience an “economic miracle.”52 Macroeconomic indicators were so positive in the
late 1960s and 1970s that some scholars even claimed that Houphouët-Boigny’s country
had reached the status of semi-periphery in the global economy.53 Aware of this situation,
political scientist and contemporary observer Sam Nolutshungu argued in 1975 that Ivory

48 “M. Fologo, très ferme, en Afrique du Sud: ‘Non au racisme, oui au dialogue,’” Fraternité Matin, 17

September 1975; Patrick Laurence, “Fologo Cancels Final Press Conference,” Rand Daily Mail, 20
September 1975.
49 On these rumors, see Ambassade de France (Abidjan) to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 12

January 1973, Archives des postes/Abidjan, Carton 43, CAD.
50 “Peace at Any Price—Ivory Coast,” Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1975. See also Kamissoko, De

Yamoussoukro à Pretoria, 14.
51 Ambassade de France [Abidjan] to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 9 January 1973, Archives des

postes/Abidjan, Carton 43, CAD. For a look at this secretive trading relationship between South Africa and
the larger Black Africa, see “Vorster Hints He Will Establish Ties with Black African States,” New York
Times, 6 November 1970.
52 For a scholarly discussion of the “Ivorian Miracle” of the 1960s and 1970s, see Neil B. Ridler,

“Comparative Advantage as a Development Model: The Ivory Coast,” Journal of Modern African Studies 23,
3 (September 1985), 407–17; Robert M. Hecht, “The Ivory Coast Economic ‘Miracle’: What Benefits for
Peasant Farmers?” Journal of Modern African Studies 21, 1 (March 1983), 25–53; Michael O’Connor,
“Guinea and the Ivory Coast: Contrasts in Economic Development,” Journal of Modern African Studies 10, 3
(October 1972), 409–26; Bastiaan den Tuinder, Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978); Samir Amin, Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d’Ivoire (Paris:
Editions Minuit, 1970).
53 Karen A. Mingst, “The Ivory Coast at the Semi-Periphery of the World-Economy,” International

Studies Quarterly 32, 3 (September 1988), 267.

An Unconventional Challenge to Apartheid

87

Coast and its president could not be “accused of having a material interest in dialogue.”54
Such observation was certainly perceptive.
However, the lack or implausibility of a quest for material wealth as the motive
behind Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue initiative must not lead one to believe that there was
no investment.55 The Ivorian leader was not so much interested in accumulating economic
capital as he wanted to attract other forms of capital, including the social and the symbolic,
that is, prestige and leadership.56 This becomes apparent when Nolutshungu suggested that
Houphouët-Boigny’s ploys with regards to South Africa might have been a tactical
maneuver in a larger “right-wing revolt” of some African countries, including among
others the Ivory Coast, Tsiranana’s Malagasy Republic, and Busia’s Ghana. In this
scenario, the actions of Houphouët-Boigny are cast as lending a helping hand to Tsiranana
who lacked influence in African politics yet needed a normalization of relations with South
Africa.57 Jacques Baulin, another observer/participant who, as erstwhile counselor of the
Ivorian president, has further offered that Houphouët-Boigny’s initiatives stemmed from
the coming together of three extremely important parameters in Ivorian political life: a
narrow-minded nationalism, moderation with a whiff of anti-communism, and complicity
with certain Parisian business circles.58
Among these factors, the fear of a communist takeover of Africa was arguably
paramount. Although Houphouët-Boigny and his friends of the Rassemblement
Democratique Africain (RDA) had allied themselves with the French Communist Party in
the early days of postwar nationalism in West Africa, such alliance subsequently proved to
be a liability. Consequently, the RDA leadership disaffiliated their political movement
from the French communists in 1951. Even more, Houphouët-Boigny became one of the
staunchest anti-communist leaders in Francophone West Africa.59
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Adding to this dread of communism, one can argue along with the New York Times
that the fear of open war was a significant factor in the political thinking of HouphouëtBoigny.60 Though little is known about the efficiency of the Ivorian Intelligence Service, it
is likely that Houphouët-Boigny knew, in the Cold War context, that the “Cape route
factor” played against the liberation movements in Southern Africa, all the more so since
“OAU’s ability to provide financial aid to African liberation movements was limited.”61
Terrified by the prospect of a replication of what he saw as the Palestinian Syndrome
whereby subaltern groups came to lose the little they had due to both intransigence and the
war-mongering counsel of “unreliable” friends, the Ivorian president received African
National Congress leader Oliver Tambo and some of his close companions in December
1972.62 According to diplomatic sources, Houphouët-Boigny told his South African guests
that he was dubious about the efficacy of violence in bringing the Afrikaner ruling elite to
reason: “Your means are weak not only at the plane of finance and armament but also at
the level of military technique.” Even more, the Ivorian statesman pointed out that “the era
when one would assess military might by the number of draftees is over.”63
Perhaps Paul Bernetel—a prominent journalist at Jeune Afrique—had understood
this rather cold realism that informed Houphouët-Boigny’s larger political philosophy.
Although the columnist did not agree with the policy option of the Ivorian president, he
nonetheless ended his 1975 cover article on Houphouët-Boigny with this advice: “I believe
it wise for Africans as well as for the South African Liberation movements to dissociate
Houphouët’s diagnosis from the cure he proposes.”64 These words fell on deaf ears; for the
OAU, African intellectuals, and the Pan-African press seem to have all agreed to vilify the
Ivorian leader for singing so different a tune in the choir to condemn apartheid.
Responding to Houphouet-Boigny’s Dialogue Diplomacy
The reception of Houphouët-Boigny’s diplomatic moves regarding the South African
question in the early 1970s did not suffer from much opacity. In both the African and PanAfrican press, politicians, diplomats as well as intellectuals questioned the validity and the
legitimacy of Le Vieux’s politics of dialogue. And this was ultimately conducive to and a
reflection of the neutralization of Houphouëtism in the larger context of African
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diplomacy. Houphouët-Boigny’s first public diplomatic initiative regarding the South
African question caused outcries from many an African capital. Thus, as early as 1970
when the Ivorian president made his announcement of planning to engage in dialogue with
Vorster, Lagos criticized it as “unacceptable” while Conakry saw it as a “dishonor.”65 In
the same vein, at the 1971 session of OAU Ministerial Council, the Congolese Foreign
Minister depicted the Ivory Coast as a “by-product of French imperialism in Africa.”66
Four years later, commenting on the presence of the Fologo delegation, Steve Biko’s South
African Student Organization (SASO) slammed Ivory Coast for “flirting with people who
were not interested in peace or dialogue, but were only gulling the world into accepting
their racist policy.”67
Yet it is in the print media that Houphouët-Boigny’s politics of dialogue received
its harshest criticism. Indeed, in the form of a trope that posited the Ivorian president as a
willing stooge working along the lines set by Western imperialists, Houphouët-Boigny and
his country emerged in the 1970s as the target par excellence of both the underground
press and the major Africanist newsgroups. Beginning in 1971, the South African
underground newspaper Sechaba (official organ of the African National Congress) lashed
out at the “Fort Hares and Turfloops, the Matanzimas, Banda and Houphouet-Boignes
…[as] agents of colonialism […] offering their services as Bantu Commissioners in the
political structure of the racist regime.”68 In early 1975 while Houphouët-Boigny was
laying the groundwork for sending of his South Africa delegation, another black South
African underground newspaper denounced the leaders of numerous moderate African
countries who had “again raised the nauseating slogan of ‘dialogue’ with the racist South
African regime.”69
Though moderate in tone, Pan-African newspapers as diverse as West Africa and
Jeune Afrique shared a similar view. In 1975, for instance, while the Fologo mission was
still in South Africa, the Paris-based newsmagazine dismissed the trip of the Ivorians as
“inopportune.” Then it continued, “It is dangerous to award Pretoria a degree of
respectability without serious protest.”70 Laurent Dona Fologo, a trained journalist, did not
wait long to vent his displeasure. No sooner did he get back from the ill-fated trip than he
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replied to Jeune Afrique. 71 In an article entitled “I Am Back from South Africa,”
Houphouët-Boigny’s emissary voiced his repulsion at what he qualified as “hypocritical
editorials.” Then he concluded:
Our immediate interest is peace. Our short-term interest is peace. Our long-term
interest is peace. For us in Ivory Coast any time is an opportune time for peace.
Our mission is not to mislead African opinion but to accept the unrewarding and
dreaded task (in a climate of perpetual suspicion and hostility from our brothers) to
tear down frontiers in the realms of fear, racism and hatred so that peace and justice
may triumph on the African soil.72
The last word in the media brawl known as “Dialogue on Dialogue” came from the editorin-chief of Jeune Afrique, who attacked Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue initiative on the
grounds that “the liberation movements in South Africa that are […] the first to be
concerned, and the majority of the continent’s countries, are hostile to the ‘dialogue’
policy.”73 Judged from the standpoint of media reception, Houphouët-Boigny’s politics of
dialogue reinforced his diplomatic failure to win over his fellow African leaders.
A number of elements explain such failure. First, by the time the 1960s drew to a
close, as one keen observer has stressed, revolutionary ideas had come to permeate the
intellectual and cultural space of many African countries. 74 In fact, it is no mere
coincidence that the late 1960s and early 1970s were also the heyday of the late Frantz
Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, Steve Biko and their critical theories on
colonialism, neocolonialism, national liberation, and black consciousness.75 Second, the
presence of French expatriates in Ivorian bureaucracy was increasingly perceived as
having a dominant influence in the late 1960s and 1970s.76 As an American diplomat
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articulated it later, wedding the knowledge of such perception to the closer economic ties
between Ivory Coast and France, on the one hand, and France’s military-business ties with
South Africa, many observers came to view Ivorian foreign policy as a hostage to French
interests.77 In other words, given the close relationship between Paris and Abidjan, any
action on the part of the Ivorian authorities became synonymous with lackeyism. It is in
this light that one can make sense of the dismissal of Houphouët-Boigny’s South African
diplomacy by some of his peers. In a similar context, one can understand why U.S. VicePresident Hubert Humphrey had, as early as 1968, advised President Lyndon Johnson that
the United States should avoid “over-identification” with the Ivorian leader lest
Houphouët-Boigny meet the “same problems he faces because of his heavy reliance on
France.” Rather, Humphrey suggested that “quietly, and with only occasional publicity, we
encourage the Ivory Coast to continue its leadership” in African matters, including the
anti-apartheid struggle.78
Thus radicalization of the anti-apartheid movement collaterally forced such a great
power as the United States to maintain a low profile. By dismissing Houphouët-Boigny’s
initiatives, however, anti-apartheid activists as well as revolutionary scholars have
overlooked the subtlety of the weapon that Houphouët-Boigny attempted to deploy against
the South African regime. In so doing, they may have left unfinished their attempts to
understand the various modes of action to subvert apartheid.
The Fologo Mission as Political Performance
Before we examine the subversive edge of the Fologo mission, it is appropriate to relate an
incident that involved yet another proponent of dialogue with apartheid South Africa. In
late 1971, Malawian President Kamuzu Banda visited South Africa, and in his honor, the
Vorster government organized a reception. Reportedly, at that dinner, the Afrikaner Prime
Minister sat between two black Malawian ladies. This caused outcries and concerns among
diehard Afrikaner nationalists who had come to believe that “the inevitable social contacts
with black diplomats would be subversive of apartheid.” They were so repulsed by the
idea that the seemingly outrageous picture appeared in every edition of Die Afrikaner for
many months.79 Whether the Ivorian delegation knew about this incident is not clear,
in the Ivory Coast (1960–1976)” (Ph.D. diss., SUNY-Albany, 1978). In fact, if it is true that there were many
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although Houphouët-Boigny approved of Banda’s visit and even sent a letter to
congratulate the Malawian leader for his courage in meeting with the South African
authorities.80 What is beyond doubt is that the very presence of the Fologos was intended
to transgress such apartheid laws as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act or the
Immorality Act. The editorialist of the Ivorian daily newspaper Fraternité Matin made that
point quite explicit when he argued that Mr. and Mrs. Fologo were the “first mixed couple
to be admitted together [into South Africa] in violation of the ‘Immorality’ Act.”81
Foreign correspondents of wire services in Johannesburg did not lose sight of this
transgression either. They underlined that the South African government was deliberately
“ignoring the violation of its Immorality Act by the Information Minister of the Ivory
Coast here on an official visit with his white wife.” Then the journalists explained: “The
Immorality Act bans mixed marriages or any other close relationship between blacks and
whites.”82 In a similar vein, the local Rand Daily Mail, in breaking the news that a mission
from a black African country was coming to South Africa, added conspicuously that the
head of the delegation would be “accompanied by his French wife.”83 Two days later the
images of the couple were ostensibly displayed as if to say that apartheid was a hoax.84
Furthermore, Fologo himself did not hide his dream of a multiracial South Africa. During a
visit to the University of the North in Sovenga, for instance, the Ivorian emissary
reportedly affirmed: “My wife is White, my friend is a Coloured and I am Black. We are
trying to get together. This is what we wish to see in this country.”85 Bridging the gap
between Fologo’s wish of a multiracial society and the coming of a rainbow South Africa
may have had a long way to go. Still the race-based composition of the delegation he
headed—four blacks, one white, and one métis—was a deliberate act of transgression
meant to destabilize, in the view of an Ivorian editorialist, one of the tenets of the apartheid
system: the myth of racial purity and white (male) supremacy.86
Despite its fair coverage of the Fologo mission, the liberal Rand Daily Mail does
not tell us the reaction of the ruling Afrikaner elite vis-à-vis the mixed nature of the Ivorian
delegation. It seems, however, that Houphouët-Boigny was attempting to create cracks in
the apartheid regime as a prelude to the eventual massive assaults he dreamed of when
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African countries flooded Pretoria with Black diplomats.87 Anti-Houphouët scholar Pierre
Nandjui has dismissed this attempt at a “pacifist invasion” of South Africa as a misguided
strategy.88 But a comparative look at the historiography on desegregation in the United
States in the 1960s suggests that Nandjui as well as radical African leaders in the 1970s
may have ignored the power of a transnational historical process that proved so crucial in
shaking the confidence of “apartheid’s reluctant uncle,” that is Jim Crow America. Such
power, as many historians have demonstrated, resided in the unintended consequence of
the presence of diplomats of color in the United States in the era of mid-twentieth century
decolonization.89
President Houphouët-Boigny was attentive to these transnational developments in
the fight for desegregation in the United States and he attempted to replicate them in South
Africa. An indication of this was revealed in 1971 when he called for the posting of
African diplomats to Pretoria. During an interview with a journalist to clarify his position,
Houphouët-Boigny rhetorically posed: “Don’t you think that the presence of foreign blacks
in the US, in all the sectors, was helpful and conducive to solving this problem [of
segregation] and leading to effective equality?” 90 Attention to the behind-the-scenes
decision making regarding Houphouët-Boigny’s purported non-violent assault on apartheid
further confirms that the Ivorian leader knew how potentially disruptive and influential the
presence of diplomats and dignitaries could be on the domestic events of any given
country. Indeed, Gaoussou Kamissoko, a member of the delegation to South Africa, claims
that Houphouët-Boigny’s appointment of Fologo rather than the Ivorian Minister of
Foreign Affairs was mainly due to the fact that Danièle Fologo, the wife of the Minister of
Information, was white.91 Thus while Houphouët-Boigny’s foray into the South African
entanglement was graphed on a philosophy meant to forestall drama, the collateral
consequence of his choice to send a racialized delegation to Pretoria was doubly dramatic:
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not only did it violate the Afrikaner legislation against mixed marriages but, as we shall
see, it more subversively assaulted the sexist subconscious of South African race relations.
The interplay of race, gender, and sexuality have had a rather long and tormented
history in South Africa. Miscegenation was tolerated and even looked at with some degree
of amusement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 92 By the early twentieth
century, however, hysteria over the “threatening” libidinal drive of black males had raised
concerns in white communities for their female members. By mid-century the hysteria
known as the “black peril” had evolved into a major campaign issue which both the
National Party and the United Party tried to mobilize for their benefit.93 Beyond electoral
politics though, the debate over “black peril” offers a window into the sexist culture that
informed race relations in South Africa throughout the apartheid era. That is because the
obsession-driven debate indexed not only the subaltern status of white women who were
posited as “weak” and “defenseless” objects to be protected against oversexualized black
males, but it also echoed attempts at controlling their sexuality. When the attempt failed,
ostracism was the ultimate sanction.94
Danièle Fologo may have sensed the ordeal that this control and the implicit threat
of marginalization entailed for women. In response to a question on Women’s Liberation
by an interviewer during her stay in South Africa, she lamented that “in almost every
country women are behind, the degree [of their subaltern status] depending on the
[particular] country, but there is almost nowhere they are equal.”95 Earlier on in the same
interview, Mrs. Fologo confided that she had anticipated that her trip “would be difficult
because we are a mixed couple, and I know this is not in the framework of South Africa.”96
Indeed, as Pierre van den Berghe put it, an “increasing stigma [had come to be] attached to
miscegenation in South Africa over the years.” 97 Worse still, such stigma was not
restricted only to South Africans as evidenced by the conviction of aliens on charge of
violation of the Immorality Act.98 Yet, what was even further beyond the framework of
apartheid—which Danièle Fologo politely avoided to name, was that she, as a white
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woman, could trample on the sanctity of sex across the color line and not the other way
round. Mrs Fologo, and for that matter Houphouët-Boigny who sent her along with her
husband, may have not been knowledgeable in the particulars of South Africa’s sexist past.
Such lack of awareness, however, did not diminish the potential collateral power of her
presence among the members of the Fologo delegation to South Africa.
It is clear that such potentially subversive power did not mean much to the
opponents of dialogue diplomacy. Within the context of the ever more radicalized antiapartheid movement, Houphouët-Boigny ultimately failed to rally people around his
agenda as demonstrated by the outcry against the Fologo mission. Although the Ivory
Coast appeared as “something of a maverick in the OAU,” as U.S. Ambassador Robert
Smith assessed in 1976, it nonetheless drew “sharp criticism for its policy of increasing
‘dialogue’ with South Africa.” Despite the Africa-wide condemnation, Houphouët-Boigny
showed “no intention of abandoning ‘dialogue.’” To the contrary, he anticipated giving
“landing rights” to South African airlines and “if the Angolan crisis defused,” Ivory Coast
might establish “consular or even diplomatic relations” with Pretoria.99 Domestic events in
South Africa and the heightening of the police state by a besieged apartheid regime,
however, forced the authorities in Abidjan to reconsider their plans.
Burying the Dream of Dialogue?
Any attempt to understand how Houphouët-Boigny came to retreat from the dialogue
scheme must take stock of the fact that the official position of Ivory Coast regarding the
Afrikaner regime vacillated over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. Although much of the
latter decade saw Ivorian diplomats calling for dialogue, as we have seen, it is worth
remembering that in the early postcolonial period, especially with the creation of the OAU
in 1963, Houphouët-Boigny had approved of the formation of a systematic and coordinated
anti-apartheid coalition of African countries. The first strategy of such coalition was to
pressure the UN into taking decisive actions against the minority regimes in Southern
Africa. These actions ultimately put pressure on the UN General Assembly in 1967 to set
up both a Special Committee on Apartheid and a Unit on Apartheid. By 1966, however,
the OAU had started to lose confidence in the efficacy of this tactic. As one analyst offered
in the mid-1970s, it had “become obvious that the United Nations would not be the
machinery for the liberation of any of the territories in Southern Africa.”100
The OAU did not rely solely on the niceties of diplomacy. In an era where
revolution was in the air, many “Founding Fathers” of the organization could not but
subscribe to a radical strategy of liberation. This found its embodiment in the
establishment of the Liberation Committee and a Special Fund to help finance the different
wars of liberation throughout Southern Africa. But the committee failed to provide
sufficient financial resources to carry out a liberation war. Such failure doomed recourse to
armed struggle as a viable method to bring about change, especially in South Africa whose
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liberation movements received just a fraction of an already dwindled fund.101 The military
inferiority of the anti-apartheid liberation movements was worsened by the fact that some
French firms had kept providing the South African government with armaments while the
British government, through the Simonstown Accords, maintained joint maneuvers with
and military assistance to the South African Defense Forces (SADF).102 In a similar move,
the Nixon Administration, following the recommendations of the National Security Study
Memorandum 39, resumed selling aircraft and other military equipment banned under the
terms of the UN arms embargo.103
Given his knowledge of these developments, there is cause to believe that
Houphouët-Boigny genuinely feared that guerrilla warfare in South Africa would lead to a
Palestinian-like tragedy. 104 Yet by citing the military weakness of the South African
freedom fighters to justify his call for dialogue, the Ivorian statesman underestimated the
ability of the black majority to regain their agency in the domestic fight against apartheid.
In fact, even as Vorster seemed to control domestic events with the establishment of a
police state through intimidation, banishment, imprisonment, and/or the sending of
hundreds of veteran anti-apartheid activists into exile, the youth in black South Africa
never gave up. Tellingly, as Vorster steadily consolidated his grip on power, young South
Africans in the townships—many of whom had joined Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness
movement—were becoming ever more radical in their defiance of the apartheid system.105
This became manifest in mid-June 1976, when thousands of students took to the streets to
denounce a new ordinance that required using Afrikaans as medium of education in black
schools. The response of the South African authorities to such public display of defiance
was as brutal as it was revealing of the desperate search for means to contain what turned
out to be the fiercest popular challenge to Vorster’s rule. Confronted with the
determination of the youth, the security forces fired on the protesters killing many,
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including primary school students. The ensuing Soweto Uprising shook not only apartheid,
but the entire world which had kept its eyes on the dramatic events.106
The reaction of the Ivorian leadership was subdued, at best. Unlike much of the
continent, the official press coverage in Ivory Coast was almost non-existent. Moreover,
although Houphouët-Boigny condemned the Soweto shootings themselves, he remained
adamant on the necessity of dialogue between the white regime and its black opponents.107
Even more perplexing, Laurent Dona Fologo argued in an editorial in Fratenité Matin that
the tragedy of Soweto happened because South Africans (both Blacks and Whites) did not
practice the culture of dialogue. Houphouët-Boigny’s right-hand-man continued suggesting
that given the revolting shootings of Soweto, it was tempting to call for the use of military
force as advocated by some Pan-Africanist activists. But Fologo concluded that his country
would not follow the “wolves and war mongers” since the Ivorian people remained certain
that “dialogue and negotiation” were the only solution to solve the South African
imbroglio. 108 While the Ivorian government persisted in the belief that international
dialogue with South Africa would pave the way for domestic dialogue between Blacks and
Whites, it was clear to many contemporary African observers that things would not be the
same after Soweto.109
Soweto did change the power equation in apartheid South Africa. But even more
damaging for the international standing of Pretoria was the police detention that led to the
death of Steve Biko in October 1977.110 Sensing a radicalization of the police state in
South Africa, Houphouët-Boigny revised his diplomatic response to apartheid. Thus,
although he and his minister for Foreign Affairs had continued to meet secretly with the
South African authorities, Ivory Coast decided to harden its stance against Pretoria. While
the Ivorian statesman never discarded his “fundamental distrust of Communism,” by early
1978 he was increasingly expectant that the United States would pressure the South
African government.111 By mid-year, a spokesperson for Houphouët-Boigny disclosed
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unsurprisingly that the dialogue approach was “not producing significant change in South
Africa’s apartheid policies.” If the Ivorian leadership had embarked on the dialogue
scheme, it was with the hope that “the South African Whites would understand the need
for change. […] But it seems that they did not understand.” In fact, the Vorster government
reportedly told the Ivorian authorities that, “they cannot make changes without facing a
revolution.” In other words, Vorster proved to be unwilling to commit genuinely because
he feared that engagement in any real domestic dialogue process was tantamount to
opening a Pandora’s Box.112 In the early 1970s, as he justified his call for engagement with
the Afrikaner regime, Houphouët-Boigny had promised that “If tomorrow the Dialogue
policy that we are initiating with South Africa turns out to be inoperative and without
effect on apartheid, we will be compelled to accept that they [opponents to Dialogue] were
right and honestly we will revise our position.” It seems that Houphouët-Boigny kept his
words on this promise.113
Conclusion
On the whole, it is true that in the long run there emerged other instances whereby
Houphouët-Boigny became personally involved in South Africa’s inter-race negotiations
and the eventual dismantling of apartheid. 114 However, few of these subsequent
involvements matched the boldness of Houphouët-Boigny’s initiatives in the late 1960s
and 1970s. At a time when Africa was discarding its final colonial yokes in bloody
liberation wars throughout the Portuguese African colonies and radical grass-roots
movements as well as the Organization of African Unity were stepping up pressure to
isolate apartheid South Africa, Houphouët-Boigny decided to single himself out through a
seemingly conservative approach towards the regime of so-called separate development.
He not only proposed to engage in dialogue with the Afrikaner regime but also promised to
convince other African countries to do likewise. Although the intended dialogue
diplomacy was meant to break down apartheid, it ultimately proved ill-timed. This was so
because Houphouët-Boigny failed to take stock of the intellectual atmosphere within the
OAU and the larger anti-apartheid movement. In an era when revolutionary ideas were in
vogue and thinkers/activists such as Fanon, Cabral, Nkrumah, and Biko were ascendant,
any initiative to carve out a non-revolutionary space for diplomatic action was hopeless.
This was especially so in the case of Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue diplomacy towards
apartheid South Africa that involved convincing people who were still grappling with the
memory of their own racialized colonial pasts. In intellectual and political circles, the
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course of dialogue became readily identified with collusion or acquiescence to
neocolonialism.
Re-examination of the strategies mobilized by a so-called agent of imperialism
suggests, however, that Houphouët-Boigny acted “without prodding” in his initiatives
within the OAU on specific problems.115 As we have seen, the seeming about-face of the
Ivorian statesman and his subsequent embrace of an alternative to revolutionary diplomacy
stemmed from a domestic political practice in which “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne” was
deployed to manage contentious politics. Started during the late colonial period, such a
neotraditional form of political communication had become in the 1970s a religion of sort
that the old statesman repeatedly mobilized in an effort to reassert control over volatile
situations.116 In this light, Ivorian policy toward Southern Africa demonstrated that Ivory
Coast’s adherence to dialogue was “anything but servile.” Rather, the use of dialogue by
the Ivorian authorities “reflect[ed] the belief that Ivory Coast, while still vulnerable, [was]
increasingly in control of its own destiny.”117
There is even room to see a subversive edge in Houphouët-Boigny’s maneuvers as
revealed by the racial composition of the delegation he sent to Pretoria in 1975. As
demonstrated in this essay, the scheme of sending such a delegation suggests that the
Ivorian leader had a keen awareness of the paradox of international policy-making since he
compared his maneuvers to the transnational politics of desegregation in the United States.
Although overlooked at the time, the Fologo mission also proved to be an unintended
subtle spoof on the gendered civility of the apartheid system. To some extent, then, the
various of Houphouët-Boigny’s postures with regard to South Africa echo Leela Gandhi’s
exegesis of “colonial mimicry.” Re-appropriating her ideas in the international context of
anti-apartheid politics, one can claim that the engagement of Le Vieux with South Africa
was an “ambivalent mixture of deference and disobedience.”118
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